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I. Introduction
Public enterprise finance, broadly defined, encomipasses mechanisms for raising
funds, distributing profits, and absorbing losses. While these functions are
shared with private finance, public enterprise finance typically differs in one
important respect. When private firms raise capital on a commerical basis, they incur
explicit obligations to repay specific amounts or T;hares of their profits in the
future. These obligations reflect the opportunity cost of funds for claims of
similar riskiness. Thus, in raising funds, they also specify the distribution of
future profits and losses. In contrast, when public enterprises (PEs) raise funds,
they often do so without incurring such explicit obligations. Even when PEs borrow
from commerical sources, they often do so with govrnmental guarantees, implicit or
otherwise. As a result, PEs incur explicit financinq costs that do not reflect the
private opportunity cost of funds employed in th:, enterprises, let alone their social
opportunity costs.
In this paper we argue that the typical pattern of PE finance yields a distorted
picture of the opportunity cost of funds employed and, hence, of the profitability
and efficiency of public enterpriese.. While thi:s should have no real effect in an
idealized setting where all PE decisions are madet in light of the full set of social
costs and benefits - including the social opportunity cost of funds employed - we
believe that in practice the way PEs are financed often contributes to inappropriate
investment and operating decisions. In our view, the primary link between financing
and a PE's strategic and operating decisions is the structure of management incentives.
Although the social opportunity cost of funds employed in a PE depends on their use
and not on how they are labeled, the explicit cost of these funds does depend on how
the PE is financed. This explicit financial cost - reflecting the nature of the
financial obligations incurred by the PE when it raises funds - is an important factor
in its financial profitability and capacity to (q?rnerate cash flows.
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In many cases, PEs are judged at least in part: o the basis of their financial
profitability. Even when they are rnot, their :.aillt y to generate and control cash
flows will be an important determinant of ent(:r1iri;e autonomy and, hence, of the
power and prestige of the managers.
This paper is organized into five sections. tin Sction II, we consider the
impact both of investment risk and the pattern scf financing on the social opportunity
cost of funds employed by PEs, and their impl ictions for pricing of capital in PE
decision-making. In Section III, we examine exis.tinq patterns of PE finance in order
to infer how capital is explicitly or implicitly ipriced in practice. In Section IV,
we discuss the likely impact of divergence bctw(,.r1 ti social opportunity cost of
funds and their apparent cost on decision-makinq in PLLs, via effects on management
incentives. Finally, in Section V, we provide .Su;(estions for futureresearch on
PE financing.
II. The Social Opportunity Cost of PE Capital.
From the perspective of mainstream social c.;t--bcriefit analysis, the way PEs
are financed by the state should be irrelevant, since all advances from the state
are viewed as coming from a single pool of social resources with a single opportunity
cost, and all taxes, interest payments, dividends, and reinvested profits are con-
sidered to be returns to the state and, hence, econorlically indistinguishable.
Although this view is correct in some tautological sense, it is potentially misleading
for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that plic enterprises are decentralized
social organizations whose managers have limited information and do not necessarily
seek to optimize overall social goals, even in the rare cases where these are clearly
articulated by the government. To the extent that: funds provided to PEs are not
"priced" at their social opportunity costs, pril; art. likely to make inappropriate real
decisions. Second, there is no single social :),Lortrunity cost of capital. Rather,
there is a schedule of opportunity costs of furlin, dl(.pending on the social risk of
the activities in which they are employed. Whil,. th,. social opportunity cost of
funds utilized in a PE is independent of the ,;,v, it is financed, unless foreign
financed is employed, the fact that this cost vLi across uses increases the like-
lihood that the explicit pricing of finance mayl not provide appropriate signals to
PE managers regarding the use of :;ocial resource:;, arid may therefore lead to particu-
lar biases in decision-making.
In this section, following a brief discussion of the concept of the social
opportunity cost of capital (SOCK) we describe the implications of investment risk,
financial structure, and foreign financing for this cost.
The Concept: The social opportunity cost of capital reflects the total rate of
return foregone by society when funds are drawn from capital markets and applied to
a particular project. In one widely used formulation of this concept introduced
by Harberger (1976), this cost is, in a closed economy, equal to the required rate
of return in the capital market lus a figure reflecting net foregone tax revenues
from investments displaced and savings induced by the increase in this required
return resulting from the additioInal demand for ca! ital. In a partially open
economy, a fraction of the additional fnds raised are drawn from displaced investment,
but to the extent that the country faced an upward sloping supply schedule of foreign
capital because of the cost of investment and compliance associated with cross-border
financing, the social opportunity cost becomes a weighted average of the domestic
market rate adjusted for displaced taxes and the marginal cost of foreign borrowing.
An important implication of this definition of the discount rate is as follows:
consider a project that has an after-tax private net present value (NPV) of zero
and also pays average taxes per unit of capital empcloyed, as well as making a contri-
bution to the country's access to foreign financin(g. Such a project will have a
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social NPV, including tax payments, of zero if it -creates no other net externalities.
Thus, it is appropriate only for a PE that pays normal taxes per unit of capital
employed, to judge new ventures by discountirln t net-of-tax cash flows at the
appropriate private market rate or gross-of-tax flow:; at the appropriate social rate.
Risk and the Social'Opportunity Cost.of Capital. In the social cost-benefit
literature, the SOCK is typically characterized as; a single rate for an entire
economy. However, it is now generally accel)ted thlat the return in the private
market is dependent on the risk of the activity Lbing financed. There are compel-
ling reasons for believing the same is true for the social rate. The rationale - r
a schedule of opportunity costs that depends on risk is that individuals (and society,
as their collective agent) are risk averse and, c()lsequently, demand a premium in
the form of a higher expected return for bearing risk. However, since they can
diversify their claims against risky ventures, in equilibrium only those risks
which cannot be averaged out in the total market or social portfolio will command
a premium. The resulting relationship between systematic risk and expected rate of
return required by private investors is shown in figure Ia below. As noted above,
the social opportunity cost exceeds the private oortunit: .te by an adjustment
for financial externalities, and it is likely that this adjuistment increases with
the risk of the activity. The resulting schedule of social opportunity costs of
capital is depicted in Figure Ib. This schedule applies to specific projects
undertaken by a PE rather than to the PE as a whole. Tn other words, a public enter-
prise has no cost of capital, only its individual undertakings have a cost of
capital.
The view that the social opportunity cost of capital for a PE (or for a specific
undertaking of a PE) may include isk premium deserves some comment, as it is
3
contrary to much of received wis- If risks facing PE investment are fully
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Figure 1
Schedule of Private and Social Discount Rates as Functions of Risk
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diversifiable within the economy, no risk premii;rn ;tould be charged. However, for
many LDCs, PE investment involves significant i(nridivcrsifiable risk. That is, the
impact of a particular PE investment on the vriral),iity of national income cannot
be totally offset by counteracting risks of otli r activities in the country. If this
is the case, capital market theory holds.that r) :;uc:h investments a risk premium
should be charged in addition to the basic irtl-,rt rate.
This risk premium will be small only if, as i some LDCs, the sector of the
economy facing the same risks as those facing the PE is small, and if the risks to
which it is exposed are not common to significant ;sectors of the economy, a situation
not common for LDCs. Where large-scale PEs dominate a sector such as manufacturing,
mining, or agriculture, particularly when these are export-oriented, operate on a
world scale and comprise a large proportion of domestic output, the risk is largely
systematic, and hence, a PE investment should tae chiar(qed a risk premium if finance
is to give correct signals.
While there are no direct measures of the lcp:Iopriate risk premia for PEs in
developing countries, empirical evidence for t'; In lnit:ce] States suggests that the risk
premium for the typical indust :.. investment i:: ,)ln ,o: order of 6 to 7'- year,
much larger than the 1 to 2% e ')ost real rate of interest, (Ibbotson an, Sinquefield
1979). Risk premia for PEs in developing countries from the parent state's perspect-
ive are likely to be higher than for investment- ir te U.S., especially in strategic
sectors, because of limited local diversification potential (Agmon and Lessard 1979).
In the case of copper mining, for example, Lessard (1977) found that within the major
producing countries' economies, a much smaller fraction of the. risk associated with
copper production was diversifiable than within the world economy.
Financial Structure and the Cost of Capital: As; long as all financial claims
against the PE are held by the state, the
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opportunity cost of funds employed in the P:E i: inilti.enrdent of whether they are
*labeled as debt, equity, or subsidy capital ( .act ion III). Regardless of the
division of future cash flows into interest, dividerids, taxes, etc., the expected
value and variance of the composite will be unaffected. This implies that if a risk-
less component of the future uncertain return i:; valued as debt, the remaining
component will be riskier than the whole and will command a proportionately higher
risk premium. However, if third parties, and, in particular, foreign lenders or
investors, hold some claims and if these claims bear proportionately more or less
risk than those of the state, the discount rat( that the state as PE owner should
use for evaluating its share will differ from tat appropriate to the profit as a
whole. For example, if foreign financing take'; t le form of credit -- a fixed
payoff regardless of the enterprises' profits -- te tate holds levered equity
with enhanced risk and, hence, requires a larqt:r ri.:;k premium. Conversely, if the
state preempts a fixed return aud grants a resi.llll share to foreign investors, the
risk premium applicable to the state's share w i 11 be less than that applicable to
the project as a whole.
Foreign Financing and the Cost 'of Capital: Ii addition to its impact on the
relative riskiness of the state's financial claims on a PE, foreign financing for
a PE also raises the question of whether it displaces other foreign financial flows.
One reason for this is that external perceptions of political risk might depend on
the total outstanding financial claims against .; country relative to some measure of
national wealth i.e., so called "country-risk". (Harberger, 1976) As a result,
the cost of foreign funds and hence the social opportunity cost of capital will be
an increasing function of the ratio of foreign obligations to a nation's capacity
to meet these obligations.
As long as s PE's foreign borrcwing does not. exceed its contribution to the
country's "debt capacity" it is appropriate to discount the country's share of net
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foreign cash flows at a rate reflecting the riskinlss of its share of the proceeds
using the analysis outlined above. However, if the PE's foreign borrowing exceeds
its contributions to the country's access to f)ri;itl funds, and thus increases the
cost of foreign borrowing, additional adjustments mus;t be made to reflect the returns
(including taxes) foregone from projects di;pla(:, (l by the resulting higher social
discount rates. Since it may be difficult to ldetermine the project's impact on a
country's access to external finances, i.t ; (,f.ra[lyl preferable to value the proj-
ect in terms of its total cash flows.
A further point of interest, beyond the sc of this Per, is that the risk
premium appropriate to a given enterprise or t lire may De lower for foreign
investors than for the capital-importing countr-, ieven after country risk is taken
into account. This will be true whenever the risks involved are more diversifiable
in a broader capital market context than within tle local economy.
III. Patterns of Public Enterprise Finance
In this section, we briefly characterizet xi ;ti£ju patterns of PE finance. Our
primary interest is in determining the "pricinq" of capital implicit in the terms
on which it is provided to the PE. Finance canr be broken down into broad types
depending on the type of repayment obligation involved:
(1) Credit, where the expected cost (return to the lender) is equal to the promised
interest rate less the anticipated default losses,
(2) Risk capital, where the expected cost (return to the investor) is a specified
share of future expected profits, and
(3) Subsidy capital, where no future financial obligation is incurred. To the
extent that the expected cost of credit or risk capital is less than the market rate,
the resulting finance is actually a combination of one of these forms of commercial
financing and subsidy capital.
Although PEs vary substantially across coiJntries, and even within countries,
we believe that certain generalizations are po,-.:ible. The generalizations reported
below are drawn both from our experience in 8.v, ral countries (Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka) and from secondary sources.
While some of our observations may be disputel, they represent out best effort to
summarize the scanty evidence on this topic. EWl hope they will be received in that
same spirit.
The discussion is organized around three headigs: (1) sources of finance,
(2) rules for distributing surpluses and (3) rulec for absorbing losses.
SOURCES OF FINANCE: Sources of public enterp,ri.;o finance may be grouped into five
major categoires, including (a) private foreign finance (external borrowing);
(b) local private finance from banks; (c) direct government finance, in the form of
equity, credit, or subsidy capital; (d) reinvested cash flows from operations; and
(e) indirect transfers from the government, ith:r via tax concessions, taxes ear-
marked for state-owned enterprises, or subsidization of prices of factor inputs.
External Borrowing: There is growing concern over the international indebted-
ness of developing country PEs. This concern is well placed. Flows of external
commerical debt contracted by PEs from LDCs rose by nearly 350% in the period 1975-
1978. Growth in PE external borrowing was particularly marked in the Eurocurrency
market, where new loan commitments to LDC state-owned firms reached $12.2 billion
in 1978. This amounted to nearly one-third of total LDC commerical borrowings for
all purposes for that year, and fully 12% of international borrowing of all types
by all debtors, including firms and governments from industrial countries. The
expanded flows of international debt capital to Es has been one of the prime
factors in. the buildup of large, and potentially troublesome, stocks of external
debt in such countries as razil, Peru, Zaire, alsd Zambia through 1979, and Indonesia
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from 1972-1976.
The overwhelming majority of foreign loans to PEs arry explicit or implicit
guarantees from PE owners: LDC governments. Ubc.au:;c of these guarantees, PE debt
tends to be treated as sovereign debt, backed i t c full faith and credit of the
issuing country. Consequently, the explicit cost of this finance reflects the risk
to the nation as a whole, and not the risk to thil enterprise.
Domestic Borrowing: Nonfinancial PEs often enjoy preferential access to domestic
sources of credit as well, not only because of the presence of governmental guarantees
normally unavailable (except in Korea) to private finns, but because in many countries
a substantial share of institutions in the financial system are also state-owned
(Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Bolivia) and susceptible to governmental blandishments
to extend credit to its own progeny. Because fin;lncial controls, primarily in the
form of interest rate ceilings, are pervasive in most LDCs, preferential access to
domestic credit is often tantamount to concessional credit.
Owing to both influences noted above, PEs are typically highly levered relative
to comparable private firms. The degree of leveriage often exceeds the commercial
debt capacity of the enterprises. For private enterprises, the x-erational conse-
quences of high leverage are well known. Except where lending irn--itutions enjoy
extraordinarily close relationships with borrowing enterprises, as in Japan and, to
some extent, Korea (where debt-equity ratios of 5:1 and higher are not uncommon)
high leverage materially increases a firm's vulnerability to fluctuations in business
conditions, and therefore involves greater ri.k f bankruptcy. High leverage in PEs
also matters, but given the reluctance of parent. governments to allow PEs to go out
of business, bankruptcy risks are not the reason. Rather, as we point out in Section
IV, high leverage becomes a significant problem for PEs because of its implications
both for incentives facing managers and for th(- disposition of enterprise surpluses.
Direct Government Finance: PEs commonly rcctie irect subventions from the
public treasury. These subventions take a vtri.t-y of forms, including injections
of true risk capital (equity), direct loans fr(rr, thei budget, subventions labeled
as equity participation (but which in actualit r rt:;ent write-offs of direct
loans or government assumption of enterprise doLt with third parties), explicit
or implicit operating subsidies, and other, ls; obvious methods of transfer.
In most LDCs with large PE sectors, governmrnt.; have displayed considerable
reluctance to furnish their progeny with true risk capital,where the expected repay-
ment is sufficient to compensate for the risk involved of the type discussed earlier
in this section. This reluctance is due to a variety of factors, but four in partic-
ular seem to stand out from experience across countries.
First, there is a pervasive tendency in LDCs, to equate finance with credit, and
to assume that any project that is worthwhile can lbe financed with credit. Second,
governments that must continually cope with fiscal "tightness" in the form of short-
falls of tax collections relative to expenditure:; (a category that includes most
LDCs save major oil exporters) often find it e-iier, both politically and procedurally,
to channel direct loans rather than equity finance to PEs, since equity injections
are ordinarily classed as government expenditure, while direct loans often escape
this label, wholly or partially. Third, government aencies seeking to maintain
control over enterprise activities often prefer loans over equity transfers as a way
of keeping firms more closely beholden to the qranting agency,since loans carry
explicit repayment obligations.
Finally, the nature of many multilateral foreign aid programs predisposes govern-
ments to emphasize direct loans over equity trans;Ltrs to PEs. Since 1967, much
of multilateral project aid (as from, for example, the World Bank) has been channeled
to activities undertaken by PEs. This has been ,i.rticularly true for Colombia,
Indonesia, Bolivia, ald Bangladesh (Gillis, 1981). Under such aid programs, the
donor extends the loans to the parent government, which then transfers the funds to
PEs in the form of credit which bears specific terms as to interest rate and repay-
ment period. In some cases, as in Indonesia ad Bolivian railways, Indonesian
agricultural estates and fertilizer enterprises, and Colombian development finance
institutions, government loans of this type havy in some periods accounted for the
majority of PE debt obligations.
Preferences and pressures for loan finance notwithstanding, government equity
participation in PEs has not been unimportant in all countries. Indeed, this method
of' finance has become increasingly more common in major oil exporting LDCs since
1973, -an rapidly rising export earnings from crude oil began to ease fiscal tight-
ness for this group of countries. Venezuela an(l Indonesia are perhaps the two best
examples of this genre; in Indonesia government capital participation in PEs has
averaged about 10% of total annual government norl-recurrent ("development") expendi-
tures since 1974. Even in Brazil, not an oil exporting country, direct participation
by government accounted for about one-fifth of external financing of PEs in 1974-1975
(Trebat, 1980).
However, not all of what is recorded as government capital participation in PEs
represents bona fide transfers of equity. Rather, much of what is labeled "equity"
in PEs represents, in many countries, little more than government assumption of PE
debt (whether direct loans from government or from domestic and foreign financial
institutions) that the enterprises were either unwilling or unable to service,(or
government assumption of other liabilities of enterprises) and does not carry with
it an explicit rate of return or dividend target. Examples of the former include
shipping enterprises in Indonesia, a number of manufacturing enterprises in Ghana,
Turkey and Malaysia and state mineral enterprises in Blivia. Examples of the latter
include state-owned f inancial institutions in Trtidonl(sia, Bolivia and Colombia.
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While governments may prefer debt to aquit/ iinaic·:e for PEs, the opposite is
normally true for PE managers, who tend to view c4i ty as having no cost to the
firm. This perception is reinforced by the f,'ti 1lir- cof governments to "price" equity,
either in the form of shadow prices communicated to PE managers, or in the form of
specific dividend obligations (see below).
Reinvested Cash Flows from Operations: 'l, i:; ';ource of finance has at times been
significant in several countries, including K;r( .t froml 1961-1972 (Jones, 1975);
Brazil in 1966-1975 (Trebat, 1980); Uruguay in L'75-19'76, India in 1970-1972, Taiwan
from 1960-1974, and Sri Lanka (Gillis, 1981). In all of these countries, the PE
sector generated more than 10% of total national :avings in the periods cited.
Reliance on reinvested cash flows has perha'; b:cn most striking in Brazil. Over
the period 1966-1975, a group of 40-odd of the larguest PEs surveyed by Trebat were
able to internally finance from 40 to 60 percent of their gross investment, a share
of internal finance that just about matches that for private Brazilian firms (Trebat,
1980). The share of internal finance in Korean [PEs, while relatively high when
compared with most LDCs, was apparently much lw:r than in Brazil. Jones reports
that over the period 1961-1972, the PE sector generated slightly more than 10% of
national savings, while absorbing something lik. 30' of investment. (Jones, 1975).
The experience of Brazil and, to a lesser (xtent, Korea, contrasts sharply with
that of PE sectors elsewhere. In some instances, public enterprises have not only
been unable to internally generate funds for self-finance, but have persistently run
deficits that had to be financed from tihe national treasury. At times one or two
enterprises alone have accumulated losses and (xtcrnal debt obligations of such a
size as to severely hamstring developmental efforts in general, as, for example,
the state-owned mitlerals cnterrpri;e( in Bolivia ((' MTsotL) from 1957-1972; the state
oil enterprise in Indonesia (PERTAMINA) from 172-19)76, and state mining enterprises
is
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in both Zaire and Zambia from 1974 through 1),78. In many countries, such as Argen-
tina, Egypt, Guyana, and Panama, the net savings ot the consolidated public enter-
prise sector from 1970-1973 was typically n((l;, iv. rn several others, enterprise
self-finance has been minimal, and state entcrL,ri:;. as: a group have contributed
only marginally to natidnal savings efforts. i tihe early seventies, these countries
included Bangladesh, Thailand, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay, (all with large PE sectors)
and Somalia, Jamaica, and Colombia (all with relatlively small PE sectors). In all
of these nations, the savings of PEs accounted for less than 5% of total investment
finance over the period 1970-1973 (Gillis, 1981).
Indirect Transfers from Governments: These sources of PE finance assume a var-
iety of forms ranging from tax concessions throughl assignment of earmarked taxes to
PEs, and loan guarantees.
Tax concessions to PEs clearly are a form of concessional transfer of public
resources, and are of two basic types: full or partial exemption of PEs from generally
applicable taxes, as in Algeria, Iran, Bolivia and El Salvador (Floyd, 1978) or
governmental cancellation or "forgiving" of delinquent taxes due from taxable enter-
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prises, as in Bolivian minerals enterprises (Gillis et al., 1978) and the Indonesian
state petroleum enterprise in 1975-1976.
Channeling of earmarked government taxes to Oi:s is fairly common, and has been
particularly important in Colombia, Ghana, and razil. In the latter country, ear-
marked taxes accounted for fully 12% of PE investment finance in 1974-1975 (Trebat,
1980).
RULES FOR EXTRACTING AND DISTRIBUTING PROFITS: In developed countries, managers of
widely-held private sector firms face conflictinr incentives both for under-reporting
and for full reporting of pre-tax profits. The presence of income taxes provides
the incentive to under-report or conceal profit;; te need to tap capital in equity
markets provides an incentive to show substatti tl i[rofits, or prospects for same.
Capital markets are considerably less well dvet.W(td in LDCs; many large private
firms are closely held. Thus, while private fimn:; still face the same incentive
to conceal profits as in developed countries (income taxes) the incentive for full
disclosure is far weaker.
PEs may understate profits as well, not only to minimize income tax obligations
(where PEs are in fact taxable) but because of managerial efforts to insure enter-
prise growth and independence. This can be done by disguising profits as expenses
incurred for enterprise performance of social or "equity" functions prescribed by
government (or, as is sometimes the case, chosen unilaterally by the enterprise),
thereby retaining more funds within the enterprise and enhancing enterprise autonomy.
That is to say, quite apart from any tendency of Il; to generate low (or negative)
profits, owing either to poor cost control or to imp[o:ition by parent governments
of multiple social objectives or requirements to sell output at less than full costs,
public enterprises may also understate actual iProfit:; to much the same degree as
their counterparts in the private sector.
Given a certain amount of reported profits p:.r [)eriod, two legitimate instruments
are available for extracting profits from the PE and distributing them to claimants.
The first is much less commonly employed than the second.
Dividend Pay-Out: Dividend payments from I'E:; to the parent government are
uncommon in LDCs. This is partly due to an absence, in many countries, of any well-
defined policy on this score. A fewcountries, notably Indonesia, Pakistan and, since
1977, Sri Lanka have adopted formal policies tow.~rd the obligations of PEs to transfer
a portion of after-tax income to the shareholder in the form of dividends. In both
of the first two countries, dividend payments by PEs have for some enterprises in
some years rivaled in size income tax payments by the firms. But in general,
- i4-
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government policies toward dividends from PE- arc vague and informal, where they
exist at all, and determination of government':- sare of after-tax surpluses typically
involves delicate and protracted negotiation:; t)(.t.wen the parent and the PE, on an
ad hoc basis that shifts from year to year.
Many governments have viewed dividend policy toward PEs as immaterial in any
case, since recorded profits of large port in:r:; (I their PE sectors have been insig-
nificant in any case. In some cases, PEs arc ;( llighly levered that large cash out-
flows are required to repay principal of their loans, so that sufficient cash to pay
dividends is less likely to be available in PEs than in their rivate sector . unter-
parts.
Taxation: Many LDCs, unlike the United States;, -lo (nominally at least) subject
PEs to much the same taxes (especially income tacs.;) as: applicable to private firms.
Examples include Colombia (since 1974), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Tanzania,
Philippines, and Syria. But a larger group of countries exempt, fully or partially,
PEs from virtually all taxes, especially income taxes. Among countries where
PEs are wholly or largely exempt from income t:ax::cs artc Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador,
Iran, and Colombia before 1974 (F'loyd, 1978).
Thus, practice on taxation of PEs varies substantially. In eneral, however,
public enterprises in LDCs pay considerably lower taxes than do comparable private
firms. While in a few cases (as noted above) ti.:; i; due to explicit tax exemptions
for PEs as a group, in many other cases PEs are nominally subject to all taxes, but
are de facto exempt, owing to accommodations between PE managers and tax administra-
tors. For example, even though Colombian PEs have been nominally subject to income
taxes since 1974, virtually no income taxes had been paid by such firms through 1980.
Even when taxed, PEs often face lower effective tx rat,~s than private firms because
of the high proportion of thier investment financ(l by debt, since interest payments
are almost everywhere allowed as a tax deduction.
RULES FOR ABSORBING LOSSES: Higl leverage in Pi~' increases the prospect that cash
flows of the firm will fall short of meeting oiperating and investment requirements.
As a result, the sponsoring government often mu.st intervene in the form of providing
additional funds either through direct subsidtic:;, rlling-over of debt, guaranteeing
additional external debt, or related methods. Such bail-outs are typically ad hoc
in nature, with governments assuming PE bank dtbt, or conversion of these claim to
PE "equity". In many cases, this recapitalization of P'Es does not result in an
exchange of future financial obligations for 'il. current ones, but merely "wipes
the slate clean".
In summary, we can caricature the above financial linkages, rules for the distri-
bution of profits, and rules for covering lo.,, ;:; follows: public enterprises
have access to many sources of finance for wlichl *:xplicit costs are artificially
low relative to their social costs. After the fact, if operations result in substan-
tial surpluses the public enterprise is often al)1e to retain control over virtually
all of these flows. In contrast, if the "profitLs" of the public enterprise are
insufficient to meet the formal commitments associated with the initial financing
terms, the government, in one fashion or anothe!r, will typically assume its liabili-
ties. Of course, in this latter case, the government may intervene in the enterprise
and penalize its managers, possibly even by dismissing them, as in several cases in
Indonesian oil and banking PEs. However, even tis link may be broken if the PE can
gain access to additional financing by arguing tl]t the losses were due to factors
beyond its control, and that it has met its mis;iJorn in supplying or in meeting the
multiple social objectives thrust upon it.
IV. IMPACT OF FINANCING PATTERNS OF PE DECISIONS
Behavioral Assumptions.
There is no generally accepted theory of how PE managers react to changes
in the variables which can be altered by the financial structure of
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the organization. However, the pattern and outcomes of the financial linkages
described above suggest that they both influence and are influenced by managerial
motives within PEs. This possibility has; slli I lhcr recognized in the economic
literature dealing with the evaluation of public sector projects.
When differences between the information aldi objective sets of managers and
the state are taken into account, the role of finalice in PE decisionmaking becomes
much more like the role of finance in private erlt:r[rises. In the case of private
enterprises, financial structure matters primarily because it affects enterprise
vulnerability to bankruptcy and because it alter:; te distribution of profits going
to shareholders (and other private financial claimants) and to the government through
taxes. In the case of PEs, financial structure, and the return required by the state
on different types of financing that it extends to the PE will alter the distribution
between the surpluses returned directly to the state and those controlled by the
PE and hence relevant to the PE manager.
Two views of PE managers which are examined here might be characterized as
a) the broadly rational maximizer of net social benefits and b) the narrowly
rational seeker of autonomy and stability.
The Maximizer of Net Social Benefits: Impliit in most economic literature
on social cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as applied to [PEs are two assumptions. First,
that PE managers have perfect information and sec:nd,rly, that they are motivated
solely by a desire to maximize some clearly dfinrld measure of social welfare. If
PE managers were really omniscient social maximi;,:trs, then as asserted earlier,
the way PEs are financed and the way their performauce is evaluated would have little
impact on their decisions regarding resource alllocatioln, output and pricing, and
reinvestment or distribution of operating profit. Rules for investment and
operating decisions derived in a neoclassical fraimework involving future, uncertain
costs or benefits would apply, ass;nminrg, of tcsrt-;s, hat social costs and benefits
were properly valued and included in the relevanrt: c:sh flows. These rules, however,
would be invariant with respect to the nature of te state's financial claims
against the PE. It would not matter whether tllhsc claims were in the form of debt,
equity, value-added taxes, or income taxes -- ince the broadly rational manager
will take all these returns into account.
There are many reasons for believing that. rnaiqclers whether public or private,
operate with much less than full information, and ursue objectives that do not
correspond precisely to those of the state. The "behavioral theory of the firm"
as developed by Simon (1957), Cyert and March (1963), March (1978), and others
suggests that the organizational decisionmakiny is "narrowly rational", as character-
ized by localized and incomplete search, bomundel rationality, a reliance on long-term
memory, strong influence of tastes, imitation, acc;'eptance of ambiguity, and "satis-
ficing"with respect to organizational objective:;. If this is true for private
managers, it may be even more applicable for P: manaqers since, as noted
by Aharoni (1979) and others, the state's objectives are usually less well articu-
lated than is the case in private undertakin<;s. Thle state's objectives as communi-
cated to PE management tend to be a complex, confusing, changing set of often
contradictory goals representing the view of vdrious:; iterested parties, including
the PE managers themselves, as well as their supJ)liers, buyers, employees and
other constituencies.
The Seeker of Autonomy and Stability: Some analysts, Aharoni (1979, 1980),
Maniatis (1968) have outlined an alternative rival objective function, one in which
a major goal of the PE manager is that of maintaiing independence vis-a-vis the
government in order to assure continuity and st a}ility of both employment and public
service programs (cf. Bolivia, Colombia, Indonc;it., thana, most of Europe, Sri Lanka).
That is, managers seek to avoid the need to appeal to the government for handouts
-- L 8 -
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or for new equity to cover lo:;se:; or new invw:;t.,;l.rit:;, as this invites unwanted
and often troublesome scrutiny or intervention. The impact of alternative financing
arrangements on enterprise autonomy, indepeidle.il, and stability will therefore be
of central concern to PE managers.
In financial terms,' this desire for autonormy implies that managers will strongly
seek to maintain positive cash flows. It may a;o Lead such managers to accept more
risks than the broadly rational maximizer otf ;,ocial. benefits, as acceptance of more
risks may increase the likelihood of sustained organization growth and autonomy.
This notion stands in sharp contrast to a view of public enterprise finance that
might arise from purely economic considerationi; assuminq idealized information and
coordination within the public sector.
We note various implications of assuming that PE managers are narrowly rational
below.
Implications for PE Management.
Capital Intensity: To the extent that the( xplicit cost of funds is understated
relative to their social opportunity costs or treated as zero, narrowly rational
PE managers will tend to overinvest in capital in order to reduce recurring expendi-
tures that will have to be covered by future operatinrg revenues or government
appropriations (Jenkins 1980). This effect will be exaggerated when PE's
access to credit is conditional on the purc:has,, of (foreign-sourced) capital goods,
as in tied foreign aid or Suppliers credits. It also will be exaggerated if PEs
are exempted from import restrictions and customns duties (as in Mexico, Colombia
before 1974 and in state oil firms in Indonesia and Bolviia), especially if these
measures support an overvalued exchange rate. whilt it is difficult to measure
the relative cost of capital goods, even in the tface of a substantial labor
surplus a variety of studies have found that Ifs tnd to adopt far mor>, capital
intensi processes than their private sector coun)terparts, quite apart :n the
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fact that PEs tend in any case to be cuonclt raLt,l i capital intensive sectors.
Many of these studies of pre-197 8 vintage are ;lmmarized in Gillis (1981). Other,
more recent, evidence adds further weight to thtc evidence. For Indonesia, one 1979
study for IBRD indicates that PEs in the industrial sector had very low rates of
labor use compared with. both agricultural activltios; and private sector industry.
Trebat (1980) finds that partly as a result of tir privileged access to capital,
capital intensity increased markedly in major Blraziliion PEs, over the period 1966-
1975, as the average capital output ratio for tecs- firms rose from about 2.8 to
5.0, versus a gross capital output ratio for tl(. conomy as a whole of less than
1.5 in 1968-1973 (Gillis, Perkins, Roemer and Sriodgrass, forthcoming 1981).
Public Enterprise Financing and Risk-Taking: I'Fs are often created explicitly
to take on risky ventures for which the rivat., :;c:tor has neither the appetite nor
the capacity. Nevertheless, many observers of 1'!::; note that PE managers are more
risk-averse than their private counterparts. { ,wevcer, it is difficult to general-
ize on this point since there are also cases i wich PE managers appear to be rela-
tively risk prone (ertamina in Indonesia prior to 19'/If, Malaysian International
Shipping prior to 1978, Petro Canada). In fact, .lly qg,.neral statement regarding
the risk aversion of PE decisionmakers is likc ly to be misleading. A more appro-
priate statement is that, because of the patternl of PE finance and control, PE
managers' responses to risk differ from those , of private managers facing similar
objective circumstances. As has also been point.d out by Adar and Aharoni (1980),
public and private enterprise managers may have identical attitudes toward risk as
individuals, but they are likely to respond diff! rently to the same type of risky
situation because the structure of incentives the:.y face.
In PEs subject to close bureaucratic control where losses or errors regardless
of size are given great weight and where little or no direct credit or organization-
al autonomy is obtained by economic success;, P; Il-n;lnaqcr; will tend to avoid risks
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at virtually any cost. For example, public entcti.>r:-, managers of COMIBOL in
Bolivia and many of Sri Lanka's nationalized psc.c-tor; apt'pear to have been placed
in this type of operating environment. Alsc, I,):;t ot thot Canadian public electric
utilities would also fall within this category .
In contrast, in more entrepreneurial. P:-;, :mBirJ,-i(r.; may perceive relatively few
penalties for economic losses as long as they(; crt irl(0 to satisfy politically
important constituencies by providing desired :;rv.ices and, perhaps more importantly,
these penalties may not increase proportionately with the magnitude of the loss.
These same managers may perceive substantial benefit:3 from economic success, since
it will increase organizational autonomy, enhanco the changes of satisfying polit-
ically relevant constituencies, as well as provide the psychological and material
rewards of a growing empire. The near catastrophic recent history of Pertamina
in Indonesia, the state economic development corporations in Malaysia, and the
present development of Petrocan in Canada ilu:;t-.raltc this type of behavior.
For any business organization there is some (; xplicit or implicit mechanism
whereby the returns to thb enterprise are tran;formed into returns which are rele-
vant for determining managerial rewards or puniLhments. In Figure 2 we illustrat-
the case of an owner managed enterprise activ.ity where the relevant return for the
management's success or failure rating is identical to that of the firm. Therefore,
given a return of R for the firm, the manaqeria.lly relevant return (not necessarily
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his own personal incomne) is also R. In this case the entire set of
returns to the enterprise, when transformed ito te returns relevant for
managers, falls along the 45 degree line OC.
Figure 2
Private (2.er-Mahiaged)_ 1-'n-rise
_~~~~~~
Manaqerially
Relevant
Return
R
0
I'
° o Return to
Enterprise
An alternative is ;hc%,i L. ir r_ , 'h.ieC ..e sub.it is illus-
trative of se PE situations. Here mnar uffer relatively high costs
when the enter-rise g;enerates a ow return (Lclow L), receives an above
normal return when the enterprise's returns are normal (L to H), and only
has his return increased modestly when the enterprise's returns are high
(above H). This mapping of the enterprise returns into managerially
relevant returns is shown by the curve DB. These managerially relevant
returns need not -----.. only the manager's salary or other personal
financial re r:- . I .: include all the returns which the managers
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view as yielding positive benefits to them. T'lh[;se include financial
gains, working environment, status, future job security, and power.
However, these managerial relevant returns art . likely to be a complex
function of the resources which remain in the co: nand of the enterprise.
Figure 3
Bureaucratic Public Frnteer)rise
Managerially
Relevant
Rate of
Re uL;:n
B,
B
B L R E{ K
Rate of Return
of Enterprise
Suppose a return of R to the enterprise falls in the normal
range. In this case this would be translated into a Rm return as far as
m
the manager is concerned, where R >R. However, for an enterprise rate
of return below L or above H (e.g., B and K, respectively), the relevant
managerial rates of rturn (Bm and K ) are less than the enterprise
returns ,- . e, . -..I ;.- ; would strive to obtain a return within
the normal r-.nQ . > ;) .;hcre their relative "rewards" would be greatest.
111
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Conversely, they would avoid risky projcpts '.'t!t t·c prospect of yielding
high and low enterprise returns which woulId in turn lead to managerially
lower rates of return relative to those of tl, nter'rrise.
This mapping of enterprise returns 2.e-s not mean that the public
enterprise manager is any more or less r;k .. e as anl individual than
are private sector managers. The transfor:-.: i ::. bittween these two returns
depends on the financial environment in t;hicr, tey work. The financial
environment in turn will be an important cor-oicnt of the incentive
system facing the management. A key determi:.ant of this environment is
the financial structure of the enterprise an.: the financial commitments
undertaken in order to obtain this financing. n contrast, Figure 4
illustrates the case of the entrepreneurial t:'blic enterprise where the
manager is not penalized as much for abnormally low rates of return as
the private enterprist (below L) but rewarrŽ!- mere than normal for high
rates of return (above HI). In this case the financing arrangements and
the institutional control of tht enterpri::,,- ar, such as to make the
prospect of rates of return ithin the nora]i rnc- of L to H less
attractive to the managers of the public e-nt2rri se than to their
private sector counterparts. Hence, an incentive is created which will
cause managers of PEs to want to undertake ure risky projects. It is
important to note that it is not the basic attitude of the PE manager
toward risk which is different. Rather it is the financial structure
and ultimately the incentive structure which is different in these two
cases.
_  I_ I_ ___________II_________
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In the existing literature on private and public sector manager-
ial behavior the emphasis has often been on the resence or absence of
risk aversion for tse groups w thout rakinq a clear distinction between
the determinants of the "anaqrially relevant" payoffs as illustrated by
Figures 2 to 4 and te risk tolerance of the individuals. It is likely
that the differences in perceived payoffs will swamp differences in
managerial risk tolerance. The particular financing arrangements provided
the public enterprise will in turn play a major role in determining the
managerially relevant returns for the various returns generated by the
enterprise.
Fi.-nan . . ..-. :l.iations: It is typical y assume that
PE managers :ouiili :-... ; -. :" :.. their social obligations, or responsibilities,
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to a minimum. But it is entirely possible t., In.li,l:'prs of successful ublic
enterprises may tend to seek to expand tlhe :.o i,:Wt :;''-Ip' of their operations,
possibly even by expanding the :;i.t of multi. [,llli': (social) objectives. The
reason for this is to justify their control (of t i,, xi;ting flow of funds and to
maintain financial independence from the cent ral govec rnment. Otherwise, if they
appear to generate substantial s.lupluses, thle ['irld: are likely to be recaptured
by the central treasury. In contrast, when public nterprises are thrust into
ventures whose market structures, cost situations, or service requirements lead
them to be unprofitable, they will try to reduce their public service load (social
obligation) in order to obtain that level of profitability which allows them
stability and independence.
IV. ISSUES FOR FUITIHERP RESEARCH
Development of an operational framework to llua[yze the role which financing
plays in public enterprise activities requires in unrderstanding of the way in which
particular financial arrangements for public ntr.rpr-iscs alter the incentives
faced by managers and controllers.
Coupled with a more xplicit nmethodolo(y for ImfJ;iuring the opportunity costs
of funds committed to PEs, this should suggc.:t wvs for incorporating these costs
into the decision-making process of PEs. In turn, this may mean that non-conven-
tional financial instruments will be needed to tb( designed so that both PE managers
and governments will have an incentive to mininri-t, the distortions created by
financial illusion.
Given the patterns of incentives created by alternative financial environments,
it would be useful to develop theoretical model.; to help explain the behavior of
PEs under various existing financial environmit:- as well as indicate what changes
in operating patterns are likely to arise when chan,-nq.;s are made in the rules governing
PE finance.
III
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An important aspect requiring further stud, i.:; te impact of foreign financing
of PEs on their operation and the economic welfare if the country. Evaluation of
the economic cost of such financing will rcjquir- bhotl ,An assessment of the oppor-
tunity cost of employing these funds by the '.:; in ;t..ld of in other uses and a
determination of the distribution of the udivr:;ifiZable risk associated with
such foreign financed activities. Hence, iss<l.; condcerring the comparative level
of taxation and changes in the tax revenues of (jovernments due to the foreign
financing of public enterprises need also to bc examined.
FOOTOTI.rt: ;
The first two authors are Institltu.. t Fellows at the Harvard Institute
for Internationnl Developmcelt and Lecturer: -, eiiEonomics at Harvard University.
Lessard is Associate Professor, Sloan Sch, l af Management, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Financial assistatr.-e from the International Division
of the Ford Foundation for the comletion of this study has been greatly
appreciated. This study has benefited frJ:i te very helpful commnents of
Ralph Beals, Leroy Jones, Richard Mallon, Charles McLure, John Sheahan,
Raymond Vernon, Donald Warwick, and other participants of the Boston Area
Public Enterprise Group seminars. All errors which remain are the responsi-
bility of the authors.
1. The simplest model yielding the;o rs;ullts is the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), I,i!ttlnxr (19r,5 a and b), and Mossin (1966).
The most important assumptions arp that individua.s (or the state) are risk
averse but agree on outcomes, and that r tlirn distributions can be charac-
terized by mean and variance. The capital .,:,(Set pricing model states that the
required rate of return on an asset i; a liltear function of its systematic or
nondiversifiable risk
R. = r + B. (R - r)
3 3 m
where R. is the required return on asset j, r is the interest rate on a
riskless security, B is asset j's coefficient of systematic risk defined as
covariance jm / variance , and Rm is the t clulired return on the market or
social fxirtfolio of risky assets.
Please note throughout that we use t.h1 tms "opportunity cost of
capital," "cost of capital," and "required Fite of return" interchangeably.
-
2. See Baldwin, Lessard, and Mason (1'91)) for a fuller statement of
the relationship between the two variablce-.
3. For opposing views on this point P;::2 Arrow and Lind (1970) and
Bailey and Jensen (1972).
4. Systematic risk (as cpposel to tc, tl rii:;k or enterprise specific
risk) is related to general levels of e(:0!rl,;mi' ,'t ivity and general
financial development, e.g., changes in fi:il or monetary policy; a fall
in world prices of tin, rubber, etc.
5. See Linther (1979) for a discussi.,l f the applicability of the
CAPM to PEs.
6. These statements parallel ModicjtLili ,mnd Miller's (1958)
Proposition I and IT, that the value of 1I I .iriiw agqainst an enterprise is
unaffected by the way ill which those claim; crre artitioned and, consequently,
that if claims are partitioned into riskles (icbt and equity, the risk premium
in the cost of equity must increase to reflo.,:t its graa-ter proportionate
risk. In general, these propositions deenlld (rn arbit : in financial markets,
but are tautologically true if one investor (tie state) holds all claims.
7. A more precise statement is th,]t if: the combination of the PE's
foreign borrowing (movement along the supply schedule of foreign funds)
and its contribution to the country's access to foreign finance (shift of
the supply schedule) do not result in incras- d costs of foreign borrowing,
the partial analysis is appropriate.
8. Figures on borrowing by LDC-based PF',; are computed on the basis
of data presented in The World Bank, Finanrci;l. :;tudies Division, Borrowing
in International Capital Markets (Washinqton: The World Bank, rEecember 1978).
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9. For example, in the mid-197(0s, t : I;, ii vi.t] government state-owned
minerals enterprises, COMIBOL, reported a lbht/t(ctuity ratio of almost 1:1.
However, virtually all the "equity" in the. .rinterprise was little more than
the combined result of past government canl(,tI.AltJoiis of overdue taxes due
from the enterprise and government assum)pti!, . t past enterprise debts.
10. In many countries, PEs are also exempt from customs duties
on their imports. These include Indonesian lti Bolivian oil enterprises,
and all PEs in Mexico. Countries where imrot; of PEs are generally
taxable include Colombia and all non-oil ent(,'Tiriss in Indonesia and Bolivia.
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Tape 2, page 3
There is an IBM book about the "vertical society" called Chi'e Nahane. It
compares Japanese and Chinese family systems which are really quite different.
He gave us a copy of it. He also gave us a copy of another book, both of which
were in Japanese. The reverse opinion of Japanese society saying that others
are very similar to Japan, how Japan incorporated. It virtually disputes every-
thing that everyone always accepts about Japan. He says that lifetime employment
is not true. In this book it says that it began around 1950 so it is only 30
years old and he thinks it hasn't been tested adequately yet. Corporations
obviously are going to find it increasingly expensive because if you look at a
graph of employment, there is a big bulge in the 35 to 40 age range. When they
come to retirement age, the companies aren't going to be able to afford the
services and pension plans to them that they are talking about. The book says
all of that is "an illusion." There will be a ceiling hit. He gave the example
of the second oil shock in 1974-75 when Hitoshi, for example, laid people off,
supposedly an unheard of thing. Some of the people were brought back but they
did in fact lose seniority for the time they missed. We asked him if he found
this opposition point of view in a book to be convincing and h said, "not quite."
end of interview
Interview with Kakuichiro Fujiyama, Chairman of the Dai-Nippon Sugar Manufacturing Co.,
8 July 1981
Appears to be between 55 and 60 years old. Masters degree from Sloan School in
1958. His original training was as a chemical engineer. He used to work for
Union Carbide in a joint venture with them. Left there in 1965 and came back to
the sugar company which had been established in southern Japan by his grandfather.
His father established a chemical fertilizer company during the war and then had
a joint venture 50-50 with Union Carbide. Then he came back to the sugar company
in 1965.
tape 2
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medical doctors and also landowners who had devices to hide their income.
He felt that military expenditures in Japan were somewhat higher than
were reported because many of the construction projects of the Department of
Construction were really motivated for military purposes such as a security
highway and communication system. However, the LDP is committed to keeping
the military budget low so that the only way in which they can increase it
substantially is through hiding it in this way.
There are three national medical insurance systems, one is a government
system for seniors and unemployed people. It is always in the red. The second
is the private corporations. He feels they are very wealthy and have to invest their
surplus funds so they hide their assets in land purchases, thus raising the cost of
land again. And finally there is a cooperative system consisting of groups from
small companies.
He does feel that the changing age profile of the population will impact on
the savings rate. Now the high level of savings is required by the absence of
adequate social security.
Are there pressures to change the savings rate? Apparently the average
savings here is about 20%. No, not really, because social security is decreasing
in a percentage of expenses that it will cover so individuals are going to have
to take care of themselves and apparently they know that. At this point, over
the age of 70 medical services are free; as the average age of the population
increases they don't know whether they will be able to maintain that. The common
practice here is for savings to take place in the post office which apparently
was the case in the United States a number of years ago. That continues to be
the case. Their post office, just as a side point, is becoming fully automated.
They have all kinds of exotic systems now that we don't use yet and is extremely
efficient post office system. For example, just for your interest, it only took
six days for your letter to get here.
1II____I.__ IC(II __ 111_1111_.·_·
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Tape 2 side one, continuation f the interview with Konijo
You made reference to a man by the name of Jiro Sakamoto who addressed his
group recently to speculate on changes within the next ten years. In
essence he saw a big change coming in as much as a number of indicators are
"crossing." For example he pointed out that the number of middle management
positions occupied by people born after World War II was beginning to increase
fairly rapidly. These people do not know the war. Also, he felt there was
less difference between males and females, that is the males were becoming more
like females and becoming less aggressive which would have a general impact on
organizations making them less aggressive. The organizations are likely to
become more female in their behavior, that is less aggressive. Up until very
recently Japan has been importing raw materials, adding value via manufacture
and then exporting. This is now changing inasmuch as most of these manufactured
goods are produced in the newly industrializing countries. Hence Japan is loosing
the manufacturing capacity and Japan is beginning to export design, technical
skills and intelligent machines. The implication of this is that Japan will
develop what he called cultured industries and he made special reference to the
fashion business and personal skills. ("Kenzo") Japan is now paying roughly
50% of its income for "miscellaneous," that is, services. The number of houses
is now greater than the number of families but they tend to be of low quality
and small.
Japan essentially now has two classes of people, those who own land and
those who do not. The former group is in a position to get credit from banks
and to profit from inflationary situations: the others are not. He agreed that
wealth and income distribution was relatively even in Japan in that salary differ-
entials tended to be relatively small. However he felt that the total income
distribution was less equal than would be indicated by salary differentials and
that there is a high rate of unreported income by certain groups, specifically
